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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on Dominique 
Jackson’s appeal from his conviction for conspiracy to possess 
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 
 Jackson’s principal contention is that the District Court 
erroneously denied his pretrial motions to suppress evidence 
derived from what he claims were unlawfully intercepted 
cellphone calls.  In addition he argues that the Court made 
prejudicial plain errors at his trial.   
 Before trial, Jackson moved to suppress evidence of co-
conspirators’ cellphone calls intercepted as authorized by district 
court orders.  These interceptions, pursuant to Title III of the 
federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
governing wiretaps, comprised a significant amount of the 
evidence at trial, though Jackson was a participant in only a 
small number of calls.  A Pennsylvania state court had 
authorized wiretaps sought by state law enforcement officers 
and information obtained from those wiretaps was used in 
affidavits when federal wiretap orders were sought.  Jackson 
challenges the district court authorized wiretaps because he 
contends that the state court lacked jurisdiction to permit the 
underlying wiretaps of cellphones outside of Pennsylvania.  In 
this case intercepted calls were placed and received outside of 
that state, even though the calls in part concerned cocaine 
trafficking in Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, Jackson contends that 
the evidence obtained through the federal interceptions was the 
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fruit of illegal conduct and should have been suppressed.1  
 Jackson also claims that during the trial there were three 
unchallenged prejudicial plain errors: (1) the admission of a case 
agent’s testimony interpreting the contents of certain telephone 
calls; (2) the admission of co-conspirators’ testimony about their 
convictions and guilty pleas for the same crime; and (3) the 
prosecutor’s mention of a co-conspirator’s Fifth Amendment 
right not to testify when she was prompted to identify the 
evidentiary rule that permitted the admission into evidence of 
what otherwise would have been inadmissible hearsay.  Jackson 
urges that those errors separately and cumulatively require 
reversal of his conviction.  
 We conclude that inasmuch as the District Court did not 
err in denying Jackson’s motions to suppress the wiretap 
evidence and his other contentions of error, even if correct, 
would not make claims rising to the level of plain errors 
entitling him to relief, we will affirm Jackson’s conviction.  
 
II.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
                                                 
1 There were transcripts of the phone calls supplied to the jury 
but the District Court told the jury that “[t]he recordings 
themselves are the evidence.  If you notice any differences 
between what you hear in the recordings and what you read in 
the transcripts, you must rely on what you hear, not on what you 
read.”  Supp. App’x at 100. 
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§ 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “We review the denial of a suppression motion for clear 
error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to 
its legality in light of the district court’s properly found facts.”  
United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006).  To the 
extent that Jackson failed to object to any of the issues during 
the trial that he raises for the first time on appeal, our review is 
for plain error.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. 
Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2010).  When exercising 
such a review, an appellate court may evaluate whether there has 
been “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 52(b).  To be a “plain” error, the error must be “clear 
under current law.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 
113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993).  Moreover, the error must involve 
substantial rights and prejudice the defendant by “affect[ing] the 
outcome of the district court proceedings.”  Id., 113 S.Ct. at 
1778.  The plain error rule “leaves the decision to correct the 
forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of 
appeals.”  Id. at 732, 113 S.Ct. at 1776.  A court of appeals will 
decline to grant relief on a plain error basis unless the error 
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  
 
III.  BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural History 
 A grand jury indicted Jackson and seven co-defendants 
on one count of “conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 
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to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine from in and 
around July 2010 and continuing thereafter to on or about 
October 7, 2010.”  Supp. App’x at 487.  Jackson was the only 
one of the eight defendants who went to trial.  Before his trial, 
he submitted multiple motions to suppress wiretap evidence of 
intercepted cellphone conversations, but the District Court 
denied of all these motions.  The jury found Jackson guilty, and 
on July 24, 2014, the Court sentenced him to a 135-month 
custodial term to be followed by five years of supervised 
release.2  
B. The Evidence at Trial 
 The evidence at trial mainly was comprised of: (1) 
numerous cellphone calls intercepted in part pursuant to Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; (2) 
testimony from case agents who engaged in surveillance and 
testimony from Jackson’s co-conspirators Dietrick Bostick and 
Christopher Stanley; and (3) documents such as hotel, plane, and 
bus receipts that corroborated witness testimony.3   
 This case grew out of a joint federal and state 
investigation.  One of the case agents, Detective Shane 
Countryman of the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office, who was 
assigned to the Greater Pittsburgh Safe Streets Task Force with 
                                                 
2 The custodial sentence later was reduced to 120 months, a 
sentence that Jackson does not challenge on this appeal. 
 
3 Our summary of the evidence focuses on Jackson and the 
relevant co-conspirators, and does not address evidence 
concerning other co-conspirators. 
   
7 
 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified at length about the 
results of his investigation.  See Supp. App’x at 67.  He detailed 
an initial investigation into a street-level drug dealer and 
explained how that investigation led to wiretaps of cocaine 
suppliers Damell Gaines and Dietrick Bostick.4  Id. at 79-81.  
After the FBI determined that a co-conspirator, Arthur Gilbert, 
supplied Bostick with cocaine, it obtained an order to wiretap 
Gilbert’s phone as well.  Id. at 80-81.   
 Co-conspirator Bostick testified at the trial describing his 
work as a middleman in the cocaine distribution network during 
the time period in which Jackson was engaging in cocaine 
distribution and for which Jackson was indicted and convicted.  
Bostick also interpreted a number of the calls to which he was a 
party.  See id. at 291.  He informed the jury that he used his 
Monroeville, Pennsylvania, house to hold cocaine for out-of-
state distributors.  See id. at 240, 282.  He testified that about 
twice a month he received between five and 20 kilograms of 
cocaine from Gilbert, who was Jackson’s cousin.  Id. at 252-55, 
337.  Gilbert told Bostick that he paid between $24,600 and 
$25,700 per kilogram of cocaine.  Id. at 259.  Bostick, in turn, 
paid Gilbert around $30,000 per kilogram and sold each 
kilogram for around $34,500 to a number of distributors, 
including Gaines.  Id. at 259-60, 264.   
 Both Gilbert and co-conspirator Christopher Stanley 
informed Bostick that the cocaine had been obtained from an 
individual named “Dom” in Texas.  Id. at 255.  Bostick testified 
that he understood that his payments went to “Dom,” that 
“Dom” was Jackson, and that he had met Dom once in a strip 
                                                 
4 The spelling of the name Damell Gaines is inconsistent 
throughout the record. 
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club in Atlanta.  Id. at 254, 263-65, 272.  An intercepted call 
supporting Bostick’s testimony showed Gilbert telling Bostick 
that “I just heard from, uh, Dom, he is just, uh, said everything 
was alright.”  Id. at 644.  Bostick stated that Jackson in July 
2010 travelled to the Pittsburgh area, staying in the Doubletree 
Hotel in Monroeville.  Id. at 261-62.  Bostick testified that he 
took Gilbert to the same hotel.  Id.  Bostick admitted that he did 
not deal directly with Jackson even though he participated in the 
distribution chain involving Jackson.  Id. at 283.   
 Bostick testified that from July to October 2010 co-
conspirators Arthur Brown, Melinda Adams, Philip Gilbert, and 
Shari Williams once or twice a month delivered between one to 
three kilograms of cocaine to him in Pennsylvania that they had 
obtained in Texas.  Id. at 256, 261-62.  Bostick stated that these 
persons smuggled the cocaine in their pants when travelling by 
plane or Greyhound bus.  Id. at 257.  When Bostick received the 
cocaine he paid the persons who delivered it.  Id. at 262-63.  On 
the day he was arrested, Bostick was expecting to receive a 
shipment from Brown and Williams.  Id. at 261.   
 Co-conspirator Christopher Stanley testified about his 
experience trafficking cocaine with Jackson.  He detailed a 
number of instances during which he acted at Jackson’s 
direction as the intermediary between Jackson and Bostick.  One 
such instance was on June 27, 2010, when Jackson directed 
Stanley to fly to Pittsburgh after two associates already had 
delivered cocaine to Bostick for Jackson.  Id. at 325.  Jackson 
told Stanley to call Bostick to obtain approximately $34,800 as 
payment for the cocaine.  Id. at 325-29.  Stanley subsequently 
travelled to Bostick’s house in Monroeville and collected the 
cash.  Id. at 327.  Stanley and other persons with him stayed at 
the Doubletree Hotel in Monroeville that night.  Id.  On June 28, 
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2010, Stanley and the others hid the cash on their bodies and, at 
Jackson’s direction, transported the cash to Dallas.  Id. at 326, 
330-31.   
 Jackson then directed Stanley on July 1, 2010, to fly back 
to Pittsburgh to transfer cocaine to Bostick.  Id. at 332-33.  
Jackson gave one kilogram of cocaine to Stanley and his 
associate and directed Stanley to book a room for Jackson in 
Pittsburgh.  Id.  Upon arriving in Pittsburgh, Stanley and his 
associate went to the Doubletree Hotel in Monroeville, where 
they delivered the kilogram of cocaine to Bostick.  Id. at 334.  
Stanley testified that Jackson took a flight to Pittsburgh the day 
after the delivery and met him at the Doubletree Hotel.  Id. at 
335-36.  Jackson obtained payment for the cocaine the following 
day and flew with Stanley back to Dallas on July 4, 2010.  Id. at 
338.  The transfers at that time included three kilograms of 
cocaine and $64,000 in cash.  Id. at 338-39.  Detailed cellphone 
records showing that Jackson’s cellphone on June 30, 2010, 
accessed a cell tower in Monroeville corroborated this testimony 
as did Bostick’s testimony that Jackson in July 2010 stayed at 
the Doubletree Hotel in Monroeville to obtain payment, and 
Stanley’s receipt for the Doubletree Hotel in Monroeville for the 
dates June 29, 2010, through July 4, 2010.  Id. at 261-62, 300-
01, 387.     
 Stanley also testified about other trips to Pittsburgh in 
which he acted as an intermediary between Bostick and Jackson. 
 On one occasion, Jackson directed Stanley to travel to 
Pittsburgh to assist in delivering two kilograms of cocaine to 
Bostick and to transport the payment for the cocaine to Jackson 
in Dallas.  Id. at 341-43.  Stanley testified that Jackson supplied 
the cocaine for the transaction.  Id.  Stanley obtained $35,000 
for each kilogram of cocaine, and he and his associates turned 
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the money over to Jackson in Dallas.  Id. at 343-346.  Stanley 
stated that overall he came to Pittsburgh four times.  Id. at 346.   
 Stanley detailed two times when he stayed in Dallas 
while working for Jackson.  Both times Jackson in Dallas gave 
him cocaine that Stanley, in turn, delivered to co-conspirator 
Brown.  On August 11 or 12, 2010, Brown came to Dallas from 
Pittsburgh.  Id. at 347-48.  Intercepted phone calls showed that 
Brown told Gilbert that he was going to a Denny’s restaurant on 
the afternoon of August 12, 2010.  Id. at 666.  Stanley arranged 
with Brown to meet him there.  Id. at 668.  Detective 
Countryman observed Stanley pick up Brown and Brown’s 
luggage at the restaurant.  Id. at 174-76.  In an intercepted call 
later that night, Gilbert asked Bostick for “Dom’s” number.  Id. 
at 670.  After Brown made a number of intercepted calls to 
Gilbert and Stanley, Stanley in an intercepted call gave 
Jackson’s phone number to Brown.  Id. at 671-79.  Even though 
there was no subsequent call to Jackson that night at least that 
was admitted into evidence, Stanley testified that Jackson told 
Brown to ask Stanley to check to see “how he got it tucked,” 
meaning “how he had the cocaine placed on his body.”  Id. at 
348.  The intercepted phone call in which Brown asked Stanley 
to do so was evidence in the trial.  Id. at 685.  Stanley dropped 
Brown off at the Greyhound bus station in Dallas, and Brown 
transported the cocaine back to Pittsburgh.  Id. at 347-48.   
 In mid-September 2010, Jackson again gave Stanley two 
kilograms of cocaine to deliver to Brown, who was staying at a 
hotel in Dallas.  Id. at 350-51.  At the Greyhound bus station on 
September 17, 2010, Officer Ryan Miller watched Brown arrive 
on a bus and observed Stanley with him.  Id. at 156.  There was 
a text message on Jackson’s phone sent to Gilbert on September 
17, 2010, at 5:17 p.m., which read: “Western Union 800 to 
11 
 
Christopher Stanley, Dallas, Texas.  Need for the rest of the 
deal.  I’m going to be on the plane.”  Id. at 133.  In an 
intercepted phone call at 5:33 p.m., Gilbert told Jackson that 
“when they ask for [the] sender where its [sic] from just say 
Pittsburgh” and Jackson responded that “my partner gonna call 
you so because, he gonna get everything together. . . . So when I 
land it’ll be straight.”  Id. at 613.  After Stanley delivered the 
two kilograms of cocaine, Stanley called Gilbert, who gave him 
the details about the Western Union payment.  Id. at 351-53, 
618.  In an intercepted call, Stanley told Gilbert to send the 
Western Union number via text message.  Id. at 618.  A 
corresponding text message with a number and a Western Union 
receipt with that same number as its confirmation number listing 
Bostick as the sender and Stanley as the payee were admitted 
into evidence at trial.  Id. at 133, 138-39.   
 Later that evening, Jackson in a call to Gilbert stated that 
“I’m tryin [sic] to um coordinate it.”  Id. at 629.  In that call, 
Gilbert told Jackson that he gave $800 to “Chris” but was $400 
short.  Id. at 630-31.  In an intercepted call made at 1:48 a.m. on 
September 18, 2010, Stanley told Gilbert, “[E]verything one 
hundred.”  Id. at 633.  Stanley testified that the statement was 
code that the deal had been completed.  Id. at 352.  The next 
morning, September 18, 2010, Officer Miller observed Brown 
leave the Greyhound bus station from Dallas.  Id. at 156-57.   
 Stanley testified about Jackson’s unsuccessful attempt to 
deliver cocaine to Brown.  Brown came to Texas in October 
2010 to obtain three kilograms of cocaine from Jackson.  Id. at 
355.  Brown paid Jackson around $90,000 in cash for the three 
kilograms of cocaine before Jackson had the cocaine.  Id. at 356. 
 Stanley watched Jackson use a money counter to count the cash 
in an apartment in Dallas.  Id.  But Jackson was unable to supply 
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the cocaine, so Brown obtained the cocaine from another 
supplier.  Id. at 355-57.  Jackson then needed to return the 
payment that Brown had made to him for the undelivered 
cocaine.  Id. at 357.  Stanley testified that Jackson returned the 
payment at a hotel with Crowne in the name in downtown 
Dallas.  Id.   
 Countryman provided testimony about his surveillance 
that aligned with Stanley’s description of the failed cocaine deal. 
 He testified that on October 4, 2010, he observed Brown and 
another co-conspirator, Shari Williams, travel from the Dallas 
Greyhound bus station to the Crowne Plaza Hotel in that city.  
Id. at 104.  In a phone conversation between Gilbert and Brown 
on October 4, 2010,5 Brown told Gilbert to meet him at the 
“Crowne Plaza.”  Id. at 603.  There were two receipts for two 
different rooms in the Crowne Plaza Hotel for October 4 
through October 5, 2010, in Shari Williams’s name.  Id. at 106-
07.   
 Countryman observed Jackson in the lobby of the 
Crowne Plaza Hotel at around 4:00 p.m. on October 4, 2010.  Id. 
at 108, 110.  He testified that Jackson was wearing a backpack.  
Id. at 111.  About ten minutes later, Jackson left the hotel with a 
“much fuller” backpack.  Id. at 112.  A pen register trap and 
trace of one of Jackson’s cellphone numbers indicated that 
Jackson was in the vicinity of the Crowne Plaza at that time.  Id. 
at 113-15.  On October 5, 2010, Countryman once again 
observed Jackson entering the Crowne Plaza Hotel with the 
same backpack.  Id. at 115-16.  Jackson entered the same room 
                                                 
5 The date on the exhibit is October 4, 2010, but Countryman 
read it as October 1, 2010, at trial and was not corrected.  Supp. 
App’x at 104, 603. 
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that Countryman had watched Gilbert leave “[m]ultiple times.”  
Id. at 116.  Countryman testified that based on Stanley’s 
interview with him, he determined that Jackson’s actions at the 
Crowne Plaza Hotel involved Jackson receiving and then 
returning the money for the failed cocaine purchase about which 
Stanley testified.  Id. at 118.   
 An Allegheny County Sheriff’s Department officer 
testified that on October 7, 2010, he participated with the FBI in 
the arrest of Brown and Williams at the Greyhound bus station 
in Pittsburgh.  Id. at 63.  He and other officers had been waiting 
for them to arrive on the bus from Texas.  Id. at 63-64.  When 
they arrested Brown, a kilogram of cocaine fell out of his 
waistband.  Id. at 64.  Further, they found a kilogram of cocaine 
in Brown’s suitcase.  Id. at 98.  Williams also had a kilogram of 
cocaine in her luggage.  Id. at 99.  In a phone call placed on 
October 2, 2010, from Gilbert to Brown, Brown told Gilbert 
“[t]wo on and two in.”  Id. at 600.  Countryman interpreted that 
code to mean that Brown had kilograms of cocaine on his person 
and in his suitcase, and contended that these facts corroborated 
what they found on Brown at the time of the arrest.  Id. at 102.   
 According to Stanley, Jackson used an apartment in 
Dallas to store cocaine which he directed a friend, Allen Russell, 
to rent in Russell’s name.  Id. at 357-58.  Stanley testified that 
Stanley and others “stayed there 95 percent of the time.”  Id. at 
358.   
 The FBI searched an apartment in Stanley’s name on 
October 7, 2010, and seized a credit card in Jackson’s name, 
court and other documents in Jackson’s birth name, a utility bill 
in Jackson’s birth name, a magazine with ammunition, a food 
sealer with sealing bags, cling wrap, rubber gloves, cellphone 
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receipts in Stanley’s name, various credit and identification 
cards in Stanley’s name, an auto insurance policy jointly in 
Stanley’s and Jackson’s names, and a money counter, along with 
other documentation relating to other names including Allen 
Russell.  Id. at 34-59.  FBI agent Detective Jason Preece stated 
that cling wrap, gloves, food sealers and sealing bags are used to 
package either money or illegal drugs and the money counter is 
associated with drug trafficking because of the large sums of 
cash involved in drug transactions.  Id. at 44, 53.  Preece also 
testified that he saw Jackson and Stanley entering and leaving 
the apartment when conducting surveillance of the property.  Id. 
at 56.  The prosecutor introduced a text message from October 
8, 2010, sent from a phone seized from Jackson stating, “I wish 
you would listen to me when I told you that shit was hot fbi [sic] 
went by da crib with search warrant meet me somewhere.”  
Appellant’s br. at 16 n.6; see Supp. App’x at 228, 230-31.   
 The FBI also searched Bostick’s house on October 7, 
2010.  In the search they recovered a money counter, $4,700 in 
cash, numerous cellphones, marijuana, cocaine, a shotgun, an 
ammunition magazine, and a razor blade near a food scale.  An 
FBI agent testified that these items were indicative of drug 
trafficking.  Supp. App’x at 196-203.  Before he was arrested 
Bostick attempted to flush cocaine down the toilet.  Id. at 201. 
 Jackson testified and claimed that a voice in cellphone 
recordings in evidence attributed to him was not actually his 
voice.  Id. at 463.  He contended that evidence admitted at the 
trial was fabricated.  Id. at 460.  The jury convicted Jackson of 
one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine.  In the face of the 
overwhelming evidence against him Jackson does not contend 





IV.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Federal Wiretap Orders 
 Jackson contends evidence derived from the execution of 
two federal orders authorizing wiretaps of cellphones pursuant 
to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 should have been suppressed because the court that 
entered the orders based its finding of probable cause for their 
authorization on affidavits including information received from 
what he contends were illegal state wiretaps.  He claims that the 
state court lacked authority to authorize those wiretaps because 
it did not have jurisdiction over the cellphones being tapped 
when they were outside of Pennsylvania.  He maintains that a 
“state’s jurisdiction is limited to the confines of its own 
borders.”  Appellant’s br. at 27.  Thus, he argues in his brief that 
the Pennsylvania wiretap statute authorizing “the interception of 
wire, electronic or oral communications anywhere within the 
Commonwealth” permits courts to authorize interception of 
communications only if all the phones are located within the 
borders of Pennsylvania at the time of the communication.  18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5710; Appellant’s br. at 24-27.  When pressed 
at oral argument, he conceded that the Pennsylvania statute itself 
permitted a “listening post” theory but emphasized a 
constitutional argument that the principles of federalism and the 
historical relationship between the federal and state governments 
preclude a state from authorizing a wiretap if one party is 
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outside the state’s borders.6  Oral Argument at 3:21-53.  
Inasmuch as several conversations concerning and involving 
Jackson occurred while the cellphones being used were located 
outside of Pennsylvania, Jackson claims that the interceptions of 
the conversations were illegal and evidence derived from the 
interceptions must be suppressed, even though Pennsylvania was 
one of the loci of the conspiracy.  See Appellant’s br. at 24 
(citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 533, 94 S.Ct. 
1820, 1835 (1974)). 
 The government responds that Jackson lacks standing in 
part to complain of the use of the interceptions because, except 
for six cellphone calls to which he was a party and therefore the 
use of which he has standing to challenge, he was not a party to 
the intercepted calls.  Appellee’s br. at 13.  It contends that Title 
III, rather than state law, applies to the determination of the 
evidence’s admissibility, and that Title III permits the 
interception of out-of-state calls if the interception, or “listening 
post,” itself is located within the jurisdiction of the court 
authorizing the interception.  Appellee’s br. at 14-15.  It also 
asserts that the Pennsylvania statute is “‘generally modeled’ 
after Title III” and follows its listening post requirement.  Id. at 
16 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spangler, 809 A.2d 234, 237 (Pa. 
2002)).  It further argues that any error with respect to the state 
interception was harmless, or, if harmful, the “good faith” 
exception to the exclusionary rule should apply so evidence 
derived from the state interceptions was admissible.  Id. at 18-
20. 
 First, we address the government’s standing argument 
                                                 




with respect to cellphone calls to which Jackson was not a party. 
 “Standing” in the context in which the government uses the 
term on this appeal is shorthand for whether Jackson is an 
“aggrieved party” under Title III, not a jurisdictional 
requirement as it may be in other contexts.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2518, 2510; United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1223 
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 
1339 (7th Cir. 1991).7  If standing is not a jurisdictional 
requirement the government cannot challenge a party’s standing 
on an appeal if it did not object to the party’s standing before the 
district court.  Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n.9 
(1969) (“Congress has provided only that an ‘aggrieved person’ 
may move to suppress the contents of a wire or oral 
communication intercepted in violation of the Act.  The Act’s 
legislative history indicates that ‘aggrieved person’ . . . should 
be construed in accordance with existent standing rules.”) 
(citation omitted).  In point of fact, the government did not claim 
in the District Court that Jackson lacked standing to be treated as 
an “aggrieved person” per the terms of Title III and thus was 
without authority to move to suppress the interceptions.  
Accordingly, it cannot raise that argument on appeal.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2518.   
 Inasmuch as Jackson has standing to challenge use of all 
                                                 
7 To the extent that Jackson makes a Fourth Amendment 
argument, see Oral Arg. at 4:08-10, we note that “standing” in 
the Fourth Amendment context is “shorthand” for a “legitimate 
expectation of privacy” and is not a jurisdictional requirement to 
pursue an argument.  United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551, 
551 n.11 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Thus, arguments based on a lack of Fourth 
Amendment “standing” are also waivable.  Id. 
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the interceptions, we consider the statutory requirements for 
suppression on the merits.  Title III governs suppression of 
evidence of interceptions offered in a district court trial.  See 
United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 426 (3d Cir. 1997).  It 
reads in relevant part: 
Any aggrieved person in any trial . . . before any 
court . . . of the United States . . . may move to 
suppress the contents of any wire or oral 
communication intercepted pursuant to this 
chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the 
grounds that— 
 (i) the communication was unlawfully 
intercepted; 
(ii) the order of authorization or approval 
under which it was intercepted is 
insufficient on its face; or 
(iii) the interception was not made in 
conformity with the order of authorization 
or approval. 
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).  The foregoing bases are the 
“exclusive grounds for suppression under Title III.”  Williams, 
124 F.3d at 427.  The Supreme Court has held that subsection (i) 
includes constitutional violations, such as those that Jackson 
alleges took place in this case, and outlaws “official 
interceptions without probable cause.”  Giordano, 416 U.S. at 
526, 94 S.Ct. at 1832.  The Court also has held that 
“communications intercepted pursuant to [an] extension order 
[based on an illegal initial wiretap] were evidence derived” from 
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the invalidly intercepted communications and thus required 
suppression.  Id. at 531-32, 94 S.Ct. at 1834.   
 We must determine whether the Title III wiretap orders 
were derived from unlawfully intercepted communications.  
Inasmuch as Jackson contends that Title III does not “authorize 
a state court to allow its law enforcement officials to eavesdrop 
on citizens of other states simply by locating the ‘listening post’ 
in the state where the state court is located[,]” we must consider 
whether Title III permits Pennsylvania courts to authorize 
within-jurisdiction interceptions of conversations that took place 
wholly outside of Pennsylvania.  Appellant’s br. at 28.  Title III 
in relevant part permits a “State court judge of competent 
jurisdiction,” 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2), to authorize “the interception 
of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting,” Id. § 
2518(3).  “[I]ntercept” is defined as “the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device.”  Id. § 2510(4).   
 We join the other courts of appeals that have addressed 
this issue in adopting the “listening post” theory that under Title 
III either the interception of or the communications themselves 
must have been within the judge’s territorial jurisdiction.  See 
United States v. Cano-Flores, 796 F.3d 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1688 (2016) (adopting the “listening 
post” theory and reasoning that requiring a new “wiretap order 
in every district where [the government] thought a target could 
make calls . . . seems unworkable”); United States v. Henley, 
766 F.3d 893, 911-12 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 
2065 (2015); United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“The most reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
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definition of interception is that an interception occurs where the 
tapped phone is located and where law enforcement officers first 
overhear the call.”); United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 914 
(7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 953, 121 
S.Ct. 376 (2000); United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 
(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tavarez, 40 F.3d 1136, 1138 
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Oklahoma wiretap statute, like 
the federal statute, authorizes wiretaps within the territorial 
jurisdiction where the contents were first heard); United States 
v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that 
“[i]t seems clear that when the contents of a . . . communication 
are captured or redirected in any way, an interception occurs at 
that time” but also “since the definition of interception includes 
the ‘aural’ acquisition of the contents of the communication, the 
interception must also be considered to occur where the 
redirected contents are first heard”).   
 We need not determine whether a conversation recovered 
from a federally authorized wiretap has been “unlawfully 
intercepted” when the authority for the interception was based 
on information obtained from an unlawful state wiretap because 
the state wiretaps that were the sources of information in this 
case were lawful.8  The Pennsylvania statute is “generally 
                                                 
8 Jackson claims that in situations in which state laws 
authorizing wiretaps are more restrictive than those in Title III, 
if a state court has authorized a wiretap, a federal court must 
determine whether the wiretap violated state as well as federal 
law.  Appellant’s br. at 24 n.10.  The government disagrees.  
Appellee’s br. at 15.  Here, because we hold that federal and 
Pennsylvania law both utilize the “listening post” theory of 




modeled” after the federal statute.  Spangler, 809 A.2d at 237.  
Pennsylvania’s wiretap statute, in a provision similar to a 
provision in Title III permits a state court to authorize the 
interception of calls outside of Pennsylvania if the 
“interception” is “anywhere within the Commonwealth.”  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5710.  Indeed, it was after cases like Rodriguez 
expressly interpreted Title III as defining the location of the 
intercept to include the listening post that Pennsylvania’s statute 
was amended specifically to clarify that the definition of 
“intercept” “include[s] the point at which the contents of the 
communication are monitored by investigative or law 
enforcement officers.”  Id. § 5702.  See H. 187-47, 1997 Sess., 
at 1567 (Pa. 1997).  These provisions make clear that for the 
interception to be lawful only the interception had to have been 
in Pennsylvania.  There is no dispute that the interceptions at 
issue in this case were made in Pennsylvania.  Hence evidence 
from the state wiretaps upon which the federal orders were 
partially premised is lawful.9  Accordingly, we uphold the 
                                                                                                             
 
9 Jackson also argues that the listening post theory violates the 
Fourth Amendment by permitting the interception of calls 
occurring in other states or even other countries, untethered 
from any Pennsylvania connection.  In support of his argument, 
Jackson offers only United States v. Cosme, No. 10-3044, 2011 
WL 3740337 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011), aff’d sub nom. United 
States v. Luis, 537 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2013), and Cano-
Flores, 796 F.3d 83.  In each of those cases, however, the court 
recognized that Title III permits the wiretap of phones located in 
Mexico so long as the calls are intercepted within the United 
States.  See Cosme, 2011 WL 3740337, at *10; Cano-Flores, 
796 F.3d at 86.  Pennsylvania’s authorization of interceptions of 
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District Court’s denial of Jackson’s motions to suppress the 
evidence derived from the federal wiretaps that, in part, used 
state-wiretap-based affidavits to establish probable cause.  
B.  The Alleged Trial Errors 
                                                                                                             
calls placed in Texas is at least as jurisdictionally proper as the 
United States’ interception of calls made in Mexico, a foreign 
sovereign.   
 
While Jackson conceded in oral argument that the 
Pennsylvania statute codifies a “listening post” theory, he 
maintained that it went beyond the permissible scope of a state’s 
jurisdiction.  Oral Arg. at 3:21-53.  Jackson claims that “it is a 
long standing principle, dating back to the common law, that a 
state’s jurisdiction is limited to the confines of its own borders.” 
 Appellant’s br. at 27.  But that claim overstates the limitations 
on state courts’ jurisdiction.  After all, the Supreme Court long 
has held that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to 
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a 
state in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the defendant] had 
been present [in the state] at the effect.”  United States v. Lee, 
359 F.3d 194, 206 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 
221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct. 558, 560 (1911)).  Moreover, 
Pennsylvania law permits a person to be convicted only for “an 
offense committed by his own conduct or the conduct of another 
for which he is legally accountable” that has a conduct or result 
element that has a nexus in Pennsylvania.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
102.  Therefore, while there may not be per se territorial 
restrictions in Pennsylvania regarding intercepting out-of-state 
calls, there are, in effect, territorial limitations on the state’s use 
of such calls.   
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1.  The Admission of the Case Agent’s Testimony 
 Jackson asserts that the District Court plainly erred in not 
sua sponte precluding the government’s case agent, 
Countryman, from interpreting the meaning of certain 
intercepted telephone calls.  Appellant’s br. at 29.  Though he 
does not dispute the propriety of Countryman’s testimony about 
“arguable code terms” like “one in and one out,” he claims that 
Countryman’s testimony exceeded the limited scope of proper 
use.  Id. at 32.  He lists a number of questions that the prosecutor 
asked Countryman that he claims were impermissible.  Id. at 32-
33.  Jackson also details a number of times when Countryman 
“interpret[ed]” a call to include situational and contextual 
information that is lacking in the call.  Id. at 33-36.  The 
government contends that the phone conversations were unclear 
and needed interpretation.  Appellee’s br. at 23.  It also 
maintains that Countryman’s testimony properly involved only 
his personal observations.  Id.  It further asserts that any error in 
the testimony regarding interpretations was not plain and that if 
there was such an error it did not prejudice Jackson.  Id. at 25-
30.   
 Inasmuch as Countryman’s testimony was not admitted 
as expert testimony, Federal Rule of Evidence 701 governed the 
admission of his interpretation testimony as it deals with lay 
witness opinion testimony.  Under Rule 701, lay witnesses may 
testify as to their opinions so long as the testimony is “rationally 
based on the witness’s perception,” is “helpful to clearly 
understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in 
issue,” and is “not based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”  “In 
layman’s terms, Rule 701 means that a witness is only permitted 
to give her opinion or interpretation of an event when she has 
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some personal knowledge of that incident.”  United States v. 
Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 291 (3d Cir. 2016).10  The goal of Rule 
701 is to give the trier of fact an “accurate reproduction of the 
event.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The evidence is 
permitted because it “has the effect of describing something that 
the jurors could not otherwise experience for themselves by 
drawing upon the witness’s sensory and experiential 
observations that were made as a first-hand witness to a 
particular event.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness requirement with respect to 
Countryman’s testimony is at issue in this case.  Under this 
requirement, lay witnesses may provide opinions about their 
understandings of recorded conversations when “[t]o the 
uninitiated listener, [the speaker] speaks as if he were using 
code” and the witness’s “opinions are based upon his direct 
perception of the event, are not speculative, and are helpful to 
the determination” of a fact in the case if the “trial court 
vigorously police[s] the government’s examination of [the 
witness] to ensure that he [is] not asked to interpret relatively 
clear statements.”  United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 977-
78 (3d Cir. 1985).  But “the interpretation of clear conversations 
is not helpful to the jury, and thus is not admissible” under Rule 
701.  United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir. 
1988).   
 Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness requirement mandates the 
exclusion of “testimony where the witness is no better suited 
than the jury to make the judgment at issue.”11  Fulton, 837 F.3d 
                                                 
10 We decided United States v. Fulton on September 19, 2016, 
three months after Jackson filed his brief in this Court.   
11 Jackson does not make this argument directly, but relies 
25 
 
at 293 (quoting United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  A case agent’s 
testimony may not “simply dress[] up argument as evidence.”  
Id. (quoting Meises, 645 F.3d at 17).  Testimony may be so 
characterized when a witness “infer[s] [the defendant’s] roles 
not from any direct knowledge, but from the same circumstantial 
evidence that was before the jury—effectively usurping the 
jury’s role as fact-finder.”  Id. (quoting Meises, 645 F.3d at 16). 
 “[W]here a case agent’s testimony leaves the jury ‘to trust that 
[the case agent] had some information—information unknown 
to them—that made him better situated to interpret the words 
used in the calls than they were,’ when, in fact, he does not, such 
testimony is inadmissible under Rule 701(b).”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 597 (6th Cir. 2013)) 
(citing United States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978, 982-83 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013); Meises, 645 F.3d at 16-17; United States v. Johnson, 
617 F.3d 286, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Freeman, 
498 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Garcia, 413 
F.3d 201, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Grinage, 390 
F.3d 746, 750-51 (2d Cir. 2004)).  After all, the role of the 
“prosecutor [is] to argue in summation” what inferences to draw 
from the evidence.  Id. (quoting Meises, 645 F.3d at 17).   
 We are satisfied that the District Court erroneously 
permitted Countryman on several occasions to express his 
understanding of the meaning of clear conversations.  One of the 
most egregious examples is when Countryman interpreted 
Jackson’s statement “you can go ahead and send him” to mean 
“it is okay now to send [a co-conspirator] to purchase cocaine in 
                                                                                                             
heavily on similar propositions from a court of appeals in United 
States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  See 
Appellant’s br. at 30. 
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Dallas.”  Supp. App’x at 129, 605.  Further, Countryman 
provided unhelpful argument in the guise of evidence.  In 
interpreting one unclear call, he testified: “So, [Jackson] lays out 
the conspiracy for you in this telephone call that Gilbert is 
sending Brown with the money.  Brown gives the money to 
either the defendant or Stanley at the direction of the defendant 
and the defendant takes the money and goes and purchases the 
cocaine, gives the money back to Brown, Brown takes the 
cocaine back to Monroeville where it is sold and distributed.”  
Id. at 144.  While the call’s meaning is unclear, there is 
seemingly no mention of code words for cocaine, money, or 
Monroeville in the call that Countryman interpreted, and nothing 
seems to indicate that any part of that conversation can be 
interpreted as broadly as Countryman did.  Id. at 628-31.  
Countryman seems to infer the knowledge for his testimony on 
other evidence, rather than on his direct knowledge of the 
events.12  In these circumstances his testimony was improper.   
                                                 
12 Countryman improperly testified with respect to the 
interpretation of phone calls at other times.  For example, he 
testified in detail about Gilbert’s state of mind.  He interpreted a 
call to mean that Gilbert “is not aware of Christopher Stanley’s 
involvement in this set-up. . . . He is uncomfortable with 
Christopher Stanley being involved in these transactions because 
he doesn’t know him.”  Supp. App’x at 140, 620.  But the 
content of that call does not support that interpretation, and the 
parties to the call apparently did not use coded language.  Id. at 
620-21.  The prosecutor asked Countryman, “We’ll learn that in 
a subsequent call, we’ll learn more detail about that?,” to which 
he responded, “Correct.”  Id. at 140.  Overall it is evident that 




 Although the District Court erred in not sua sponte 
precluding the objectionable evidence that we have identified, 
we cannot conclude that the Court’s error can be characterized 
as plain.  Inasmuch as we decided Fulton, a case that would 
have been useful to the Court, after the trial in this case had 
concluded, the Court did not have the benefit of that opinion at 
the trial.  Thus, we decline to hold that the error in admitting 
evidence regarding the interpretation of the calls was plain or 
obvious.  Furthermore, even if we held otherwise, Jackson 
would bear the burden of showing that the error was prejudicial 
by impacting on the outcome of the trial, thereby affecting his 
substantial rights.  Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. 
 The testimony of Jackson’s co-conspirators Dietrick Bostick 
and Christopher Stanley provided much of the same information 
as Countryman set forth in his interpretations of the phone calls, 
and the jury on its own could review the calls that Countryman 
wrongfully interpreted to reach its own conclusion as to their 
meaning in light of Bostick’s and Stanley’s testimony and the 
other evidence.13   
2.  The Admission of the Co-Conspirators’ Testimony about 
                                                 
13 In his brief Jackson contends that the testifying co-
conspirators though “to a lesser extent” than Countryman, 
Appellant’s br. at 36, gave improper evidence interpreting 
telephone calls.  He does not, however, make reference to this 
testimony in his statement of issues in his brief, see id. at 9-10, 
and therefore he has waived the argument.  See Laborers’ Int’l 
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 
F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party 
raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes ‘a passing 
reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue 
before this court.’”) (citation omitted). 
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their Convictions and Pleas of Guilty 
 Jackson contends that the government wrongfully 
attempted to use two of his co-conspirators’ guilty pleas as 
substantive evidence of his guilt, although he “recognizes that it 
is not always error to inform a jury as to a co-defendant’s guilty 
plea[,] especially when the jury is given a cautionary 
instruction” such as the District Court gave here.  Appellant’s 
br. at 40.  In arguing that the admission of evidence of the guilty 
pleas was a plain error, Jackson in his brief cites our statement 
in United States v. Gullo that  
[t]he guilty plea to a conspiracy charge carries 
with it more potential harm to the defendant on 
trial because the crime by definition requires the 
participation of another.  The jury could not fail to 
appreciate the significance of this and would 
realize . . . that ‘it takes two to tango.’   
Id. at 41 (quoting United States v. Gullo, 502 F.2d 759, 
761 (3d Cir. 1974) (citation omitted)).   
 We have “repeatedly held that the government may 
introduce neither a witness’s guilty plea nor his or her 
concomitant plea agreement as substantive evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt.”  United States v. Universal Rehabilitation 
Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 668 (3d Cir. 2000).  Yet, a 
witness’s guilty plea is admissible under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 for at least three purposes: “(1) to allow the jury 
accurately to assess the credibility of the witness; (2) to 
eliminate any concern that the jury may harbor concerning 
whether the government has selectively prosecuted the 
defendant; and (3) to explain how the witness has first-hand 
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knowledge concerning the events about which he/she is 
testifying.”  Id. at 665.  We have noted that  
[w]hen a co-conspirator testifies he took part in 
the crime with which the defendant is charged, his 
credibility will automatically be implicated.  
Questions will arise in the minds of the jurors 
whether the co-conspirator is being prosecuted, 
why he is testifying, and what he may be getting 
in return.  If jurors know the terms of the plea 
agreement, these questions will be set to rest and 
they will be able to evaluate the declarant’s 
motives and credibility.   
United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 1994).  We 
held that “[a]s such, we are satisfied that the government may 
seek to introduce a witness’s guilty plea and/or plea agreement 
even in the absence of a challenge to the witness’s credibility.”  
Universal Rehabilitation Servs. (PA), 205 F.3d at 666.   
 Here, the government’s use of the co-conspirators’ guilty 
pleas was permissible.  Co-conspirator Bostick testified while 
wearing prison attire.  Supp. App’x at 240.  The prosecutor 
asked him why he was wearing that clothing and questioned him 
about the charges against him.  Id. at 240-41.  The prosecutor 
then discussed the terms of his guilty plea with him, making the 
jury aware that Bostick was testifying because of his plea 
agreement with the hope that he might receive a reduced 
sentence in return for his testimony.  Id. at 241-45.  The 
prosecutor also elicited testimony from Bostick that he had not 
been guaranteed that he would be given a reduction in sentence 
for testifying and that he would not perjure himself at the trial.  
Id.  Then, the prosecutor asked Bostick about his prior felonies 
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and drug use.  Id. at 246-51.  After completing that line of 
questioning, the prosecutor addressed the current case, asking, 
“Now, you already indicated you pled guilty for your role in a 
drug trafficking conspiracy, correct?”  Id. at 251.  She then 
asked a number of questions about the conspiracy before she 
finally asked about Jackson.  Id. at 251-54.   
 The prosecutor engaged in the same type of examination 
of co-conspirator Christopher Stanley.  The prosecutor started 
her examination of Stanley by asking him about his current 
incarceration and the charges to which he pleaded guilty.  Id. at 
310-11.  She then elicited that he was testifying in the hope that, 
per his plea agreement, his sentence would be reduced.  Id. at 
312-13.  As was the case with Bostick, the prosecutor drew 
testimony from Stanley recognizing his understanding that the 
judge, not the prosecution, would determine his sentence, and he 
could be prosecuted if he lied in giving his testimony.  Id.  After 
that testimony, he testified about his prior crimes and whether he 
was in the same jail as other co-conspirators.  Id. at 313-16.  
Only then did the prosecutor ask him about his drug trafficking 
history, at which time he mentioned Jackson.  Id. at 316.   
 Neither of these uses of the co-conspirators’ guilty pleas 
was impermissible.  The evidence regarding the guilty pleas all 
went to the heart of whether the co-conspirator witnesses were 
credible, whether the government selectively was prosecuting 
Jackson, and whether the co-conspirators had firsthand 
knowledge of the crime for which Jackson was being tried.  The 
evidence clearly was not offered as substantive evidence of 
Jackson’s guilt.  Furthermore, the District Court provided an 
appropriate limiting instruction with respect to the guilty plea 
evidence at the end of the case.  Id. at 495-96.  Therefore, the 
Court did not err at all, let alone commit plain error, in allowing 
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the guilty plea testimony.  
 
 
3.  The Government’s Mention of a Co-Conspirator’s Fifth 
Amendment Right Not to Testify 
 Jackson argues that the District Court made a plain error 
when, in response to its question about which exception to the 
hearsay rule applied to the admission of Gilbert’s otherwise-
hearsay testimony, the prosecutor stated that “[t]he exception is 
Arthur Gilbert cannot take the stand.  He has a Fifth 
Amendment privilege where the government cannot force him to 
come in to testify.  He is unavailable to this Court and thereby it 
would be an exception to hearsay.”  Id. at 253.   
 We have recognized that it may be improper for a 
prosecutor to refer to the invocation of a Fifth Amendment 
privilege to encourage a jury to infer a witness’s guilt.  See, e.g., 
Nezowy v. United States, 723 F.2d 1120, 1124 (3d Cir. 1983); 
United States ex rel. Fournier v. Pinto, 408 F.2d 539, 541 (3d 
Cir. 1969).  “[W]e may reverse” on plain error review, however, 
“only if we find an error in the prosecutor’s comments so 
serious as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and 
contribute to a miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[O]ur objective is not to 
penalize the prosecutor for an inopportune remark, but to ensure 
that the appellant[] received a fair trial.”  Id.   
 Here, the prosecutor’s response to the District Court’s 
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question about the applicable hearsay exceptions was a failed 
and incomplete attempt to claim a Federal Rule of Evidence 804 
exception which applies when a witness is unavailable based on 
his invocation of privilege pursuant to Rule 804(a)(1).  The 
Court instead ruled that it was admissible as a statement of a co-
conspirator under Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(E).  While the 
prosecutor’s mention of a witness’s invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment in front of the jury was inopportune, the error in the 
admission of the evidence was not so serious that it was a plain 
error.   
4.  The Cumulative Effect of the Aforementioned Actions 
 Inasmuch as we hold that none of the issues that Jackson 
raises demonstrates that there was a plain error at his trial, we 
need not analyze whether the cumulative effect of plain error on 
the trial requires that we reverse Jackson’s conviction.   
   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Jackson’s 
judgment of conviction and sentence entered on July 24, 2014.  
 
